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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CONTINENTAL THRIFT AND 
LOAN COMP ANY, 
PlatiJn,tijf a;nd Appellaint, 
-vs.-
JOHN L. ALLEN and 
PHYLLIS S. ALLEN, 
-vs.-
Def endarnts arnd 
Third Party Plaintiffs, 
WILLLIAM KELSON and 
ROY COLLARD, 
Third Party Defendoots, 
and 
MAURICE ANDERSON, 
Jn.tervenor and Respondent. 
Case 
No.11299 
AP'P·ELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This case involves an action by plaintiff and appel-
lant who obtained a judgment against defendants and 
also Rn assignment of a judgment obtained by defendants 
against third party defendant, Roy Collard. Plaintiff 
and appellant executed upon an automobile registered 
in the name of Roy Collard and Maurice Anderson. 
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Maurice Anderson intervened in the action claiming that 
the automobile was owned solely by him. 
The question presented for determination herein is 
whether or not Roy Collard owned any interest in the 
automobile and, if so, what the extent of that owner-
ship interest was. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Intervenor obtained an Order to Show Cause based 
upon his affidavit seeking an order directing plaintiff and 
appellant to release the custody of the automobile in 
question and to deliver possession of same to him. Upon 
a hearing of the matter the District Court of Salt Lake 
County issued its order directing that plaintiff forthwith 
release possession of the automobile and deliver it to 
intervenor. It is from this order that plaintiff and 
appellant appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the order of the lower 
court and reinstatement of the order of execution origi-
nally entered by the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 1, 1964, plaintiff obtained a judgment 
against defendants, John L. Allen and Phyllis Allen, for 
the sum of $8,703.88. At the same time, defendants ob-
tained a judgment against third party defendant, Hoy 
Collard for the same amount as the judgment that 1r11~ 
' 
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rendered against him (R. 1). Later, on January 11, 
1965, defendants, Allen, assigned their judgment against 
third party defendant, Collard, to plaintiff (R. 3). Pur-
suant to the assignment of said judgment and on April 
15, 1968, plaintiff obtained an order of execution from the 
lower court on the unexempt property of Roy Collard 
(R. 4). In accordance with the directions in the executon 
an employee of the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office lev-
ied on a 1968 Cadillac 2-Door Hardtop automobile and 
stored the vehicle at the Broadway Garage in Salt Lake 
City (R. 5, 6). 
Shortly after the action of the sheriff's office in 
le\7ing upon the automobile, Maurice Anderson filed his 
Petition For Interpleader claiming that even though the 
Certificate of Title showed himself and Roy Collard to 
be the owners of the vehicle, Mr. Collard did not have any 
interest in the automobile (R. 6, 7). The court permitted 
the interpleader (R. 9) and upon an affidavit of Roy 
Collard, (R. 10, 11) the court issued its Order to Show 
Cause ordering plaintiff to appear in court on a day cer-
tain to show cause why the Cadillac automobile should 
not he delivered to Maurice Anderson upon the ground 
that he had the sole ownership interest in the vehicle 
(B..12). 
It seems that on approximately January 25, 1968, 
Roy Collard was indebted to Maurice Anderson in the 
approximate sum of $30,000 (R. 24 T. 2). In that date 
l\Ir. Collard went to see Mr. Anderson "·with a proposi-
tion to buy an automobile." Collard told Anderson that 
!tr' had a promotion which had just reached the state of 
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completion and he needed to make several trips to con-
summate the deal quickly ( R. 25 T. 3). Anderson was ap-
parently advised by Collard that if he would loan him 
the money to buy a car, he, Collard, could pay Anderson 
what was owed to him in a very short time (R. 25, T. 3). 
Upon these assurances Mr. Anderson bought Mr. Collard 
the automobile and took a promissory note from him for 
the purchase price (R. 25 T. 3). 
The transaction was handled by Mr. Anderson mak-
ing his check payable to Carleson Cadillac Company in 
the amount of $8,200.00 in payment of the car (R. 25, T. 
3). The vehicle, a 1968 Cadillac 2-Door Hardtop Fleet-
wood Eldorado, was registered and titled in the names 
of Roy Collard and Maurice Anderson, and as part of 
the same transaction Collard delivered his promissory 
note in the amount of $8,200.00 dated January 25, 1968, 
to Mr. Anderson (R. 25, T. 3). There is no evidence to 
show that Mr. Collard transferred title to the automo-
bile and certainly no evidence of any kind to establish 
the fact that Mr. Collard transferred title to the vehicle 
to Mr. Anderson prior to the time the automobile was 
levied upn by Continental Thrift and Loan. 
On these facts the lower court found that Maurice 
Anderson was the sole owner of the automobile in ques-
tion and ordered that the vehicle be released from the 
writ of execution and delivered to Mr. Anderson. 
It is from that order that this appeal is taken. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT DE-
FENDANT, ROY COLLARD, DID NOT HAVE 
ANY OWNERSHIP INTEREST IN THE AU-
TOMOBILE IN QUESTION. 
The testmony of Mr. Anderson, taken at the time of 
the hearing on his Order to Show Cause against plaintiff, 
is significant though short. Taking the testimony as it is, 
and presenting it as favorably as one can for Interve-
nor it seems obvious to plaintiff that Mr. Anderson had 
no ownership interest in the Cadillac automobile at any 
time and it was not intended by either himself or Mr. Col-
lard that he have any. It is equally as obvious that what 
Mr. Anderson attempted to do was obtain security for 
the promissory note delivered to him from Collard. 
Anderson testified that Collard came to him and said 
that "he had a promotion which had just reached the 
state of cmpletion and he needed a car very badly and 
with this car he would be able to consummate the deal 
nry quickly because he had several trips" to make (R. 
25, T. 3). Mr. Anderson further stated that Collard said 
that if he (Anderson) would loan him (Collard) the 
money to buy a car he was sure he could pay Anderson 
·what he owed him in a very few days or a few weeks. 
It was testified by Mr. Anderson, ''So I bought him 
this car and took a note for it" (R. 25, T. 3). 
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Later in his tesitmony l\Ir. Anderson was asked the 
following question by his attorney, Eldredge Grant, to 
which he responded: 
Q. The purpose of your buying the automobile 
for Mr. Collard was to give him the opportu-
nity to earn the money to pay you back? 
A. That is right. 
The testimony of Anderson as it relates to what both 
he and Collard said and what they intended is (1) that 
Collard desired to borrow $8,200 from Anderson so 
that he could buy a car, thus indicating that he wanted 
to own the car and owe Anderson for the purchase price; 
(2) that Anderson approved of the suggestion and he 
therefore bought Collard the automobile, indicating that 
Collard was the O"wner of it and not Anderson; and (3) 
that Anderson took and accepted Collard's note for the 
purchase price of the car, indicating that both parties 
intended that the automobile was Collard's and the prom-
issory note with the obligations evidenced thereby was 
Anderson's, thus giving Anderson the right to proceed 
against Collard upon a negotiable instrument if he failed 
to repay the purchase eprice of the car. 
Appellant's position is buttressed in this regard by 
Mr. Anderson, who stated that on May 3, 1968, .Mr. Col-
lard transferred the title to him (R. 25, T. 3, R. 26, T. 4) 
and that this was done for title purposes only: 
Q. So the car has, for title purposes, heen given 
hack to you? 
A. That is right. 
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Here again it is apparent that after plaintiff levied 
upon the automobile Mr. Collard transferred title of it 
to Mr. Anderson so that for title purposes only, and not 
for purposes of showing who was the actual owner An-
derson would appear as the owner of the car. It could 
not be more obvious then that this move was a flagrant 
attempt by both Collard and Anderson to defeat the le-
gitimate efforts of Collard's creditors to partially satisfy 
its judgment. 
According to the great weight of authority, owner-
ship of a motor vehicle may be evidenced by possession 
of a certificate of title relating to such vehicle, although 
such documents do not ordinarily establish conclusively 
the ownership of such vehicle, but are merely prima facie 
evidence of it. 7 Am. J ur. 2d, Automobiles and High-
way Traffic, Secs. 23 et seq. In this regard Utah follows 
the general rule establishing that the certificate of title 
to an automobile is only prima facie evidence of owner-
ship &nd that the presumption created thereby is rebut-
tahle. Jackson v. Jones, 97 Utah 41, 89 P. 2d 235; Swartz 
v. TVhite, 80 Utah 150, 13 P. 2d 643; Ferguson v. Reynolds, 
52 Utah 583, 176 P. 267. Other Utah cases supporting 
this proposition, although not dealing directly with this 
identical question, are Dahl v. Pr,ince, 119 Utah 556, 230 
P. 2d 328; Stewart v. Commerce Insura;nce Company of 
Glens Falls, N. Y., 114 Utah 278, 198 P. 2d 467. 
For cases of sister jurisdictions in this regard see 
Lynn v. Herman, 72 Cal. App. 2d 64, 165 P. 2d 54; Fred-
erico v. Universal C.l.T. Credit Corp., 140 Colo. 145, 343 
P. 2d 830; Starr v. TVelch, (Okla.) 323 P. 2d 349; Dicillo 
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v. Osborn, 204 Or. 171, 282 P. 2d 611; Jenkin v. Anderson, 
12 Wash. 2d 58, 120 P. 2d 548, Supplemented 12 Wash. 
2d 58, 123 P. 2d 759. 
Appellant contends, and it believes not without a 
good deal of merit, that the evidence shows that even 
though the title to the Cadillac automobile disclosed both 
Maurice Anderson and Roy Collard as the owners there-
of, in fact Roy Collard was intended to be and was the 
true and sole owner thereof. The implications of a con-
trary finding are so fraught with inequities as to Mr. 
Collard that one can be assured that he did not intend Mr. 
Anderson to be the sole owner of the vehicle. Otherwise 
the parties have put Mr. Collard in the ridiculous and 
unbelievable position of having borrowed the sum of 
$8,200 to buy an automobile, having given a promissory 
note for the purchase price and being obligated to An-
derson on that and then finding himself in the unenviable 
situation of not owning the autombile for which he is 
obligated to pay. 
Certainly it should be apparent that neither Collard 
nor Anderson intended this to be the result. It should be 
equally apparent that what they did intend was that Col-
lard own the automobile and that he owe Anderson for 
the purchase price pursuant to the promissory note. 
Again, it seems obvious that by having his name on the 
certificate of title, both Mr. Anderson and Mr. Collard 
attempted and intended that Anderson have security for 
payment of the promissory note given him by Collard. 
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POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE 
AUTOMOBILE RELEASED FROM PLAIN-
TIFF'S EXECUTION BECAUSE INTERVEN-
OR'S ATTEMPT TO RETAIN A SECURITY 
INTEREST IN THE VEHICLE WAS DE-
FECTIVE. 
Appellant incorporates by reference into Point II of 
this brief th eargument and law set forth in Point I. 
Section 70A-9-103(4) Uniform Commercial Code, 
U.C.A., 1953, provides as follows: 
"Notwithstanding subsections (2) and (3), if per-
sonal property is covered by a certificate of title 
issued under a statute of this state or any other 
jurisdiction which requires indication on a cer-
tificate of title of any security interest in the prop-
erty as a condition of perfection, then the perf ec-
tion is governed by the law of the jurisdiction 
which issued the certificate.'' 
Section 70A-9-302 Uniform Commercial Code, 
U.C.A., 1953, provides as follows: 
" ( 1) A financial statement must be filed to per-
fect all security interests except the following: 
* * * * 
( 3) The filing provisions of the chapter do not 
apply to a security interest in property subject 
to a statute 
(a) * * * * 
(b) of this state which provides for central 
filing of security interests which is not in-
ventory held for sale for which a certificate 
of title is required under the statutes of this 
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state if a violation of such a security interest 
can be indicated by a public official on a cer-
tificate or a duplicate thereof. 
( 4) A security interest in property covered bv 
a statute described in subsection ( 3) can be pe1:_ 
focted only by registration or filing under that 
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statute or by indication of the security interest on : 
a certificate of title or a duplicate thereof by a 
public official. '' 
The transaction that occurred between Mr. Ander-
son and Mr. Collard is not covered by the Commercial , 
Code. One therefore must go to the Motor Vehicle Ar.t 
of the Code in order to determine the requisites for va-
lidity of an encumbrance on the automobile. The fol-
lowing Code provisions of U.C.A., 1953, are applicable: 
"41-1-37. Certificate of title - Contents. The 
certificate of title shall contain upon the fare 
thereof the identical information required upon 
the face of the registration card and in addition 
thereto a statement of the owner's title and of all 
liens and encumbrances upon the vehicle therein 
described, and whether possession is held by the 
owner under a lease, contract of conditional sale, 
or other like agreement. Said certificate shall 
bear thereon the seal of the department. 
"41-1-38. Certificate of title - Signature of 
owner - Notation of liens. - The certificate of 
title shall contain upon the reverse side a space 
for the signature of the owner and the owner shall 
write his name with pen and ink in such space 
upou the reverse side forms for assignmeut of 
title or interest and warranty thereof by the 
owner with space for notation of liens and encum-
brances upon the vehicle at the time of a transfer. 
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"41-1-80. Filing liens and encumbrances. - No 
conditional sale contract, conditional lease, chattel 
mortgage, or other lien or encumbrance or title 
retention instrument upon a registered vehicle, 
other than a lien dependent upon possession, is 
valid as against the creditors of an owner acquir-
ing a lien by levy or attachment or subsequent 
purchasers or encumbrances without notice until 
the requirements of sections 41-1-81 to 41-1-87 
have been complied with. 
"41-1-81. Filing instrument creating lien or en-
cumbrance. - There shall be deposited with the 
department a copy of the instrument creating and 
evidencing such lien or encumbrance, which in-
strument is executed in the manner required by 
the laws of this state with an attached or en-
dorsed certificate of a notary public stating that 
the same is true· and correct copy of the original 
and accompanied by the certificate of title last 
issued for such vehicle. 
"41-1-82. Instruments to accompany application 
for original registration. - If the vehicle is of a 
type subject to registration hereunder but has not 
yet been registered and no certificate of title has 
been issued therefor then the certified copy of 
the instrument creating such lien or encumbrance 
shall be accompanied by an application by the 
owner in usual form for an original registration 
and issuance of an original ceTtificate of title. In 
every such event such application shall be accom-
panied by the fee or fees as provided in this act. 
"41-1-85. Filing effective to give notice. - Such 
filing and the issuance of a new certificate of title 
as provided in sections 41-1-81 to 41-1-84, shall 
constitute constructive notice of all liens and en-
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cumbrances against the vehicle described therein 
to creditors of the owner, or to subsequent pur-
chasers and encumbrances.'' 
As the statutes indicate, no lien or encumbrance or 
title retention instrument upon a registered vehicle, other 
than a lien dependent upon possession, is valid as against 
the creditors of the owner acquiring a lien by levy or 
attachment. 
In the instant case, Continental Thrift and Loan ob-
tained a. lien against the Cadillac automobile by reason of 
a levy of execution on May 2, 1968 (R. 5). At that time 
even though both Mr. Anderson and Mr. Collard were 
shown as the o\vners of the vehicle in question, it is clear 
that both men intended that Mr. Collard was the mvner 
of the car and that :Mr. Anderson was shown as an owner, 
not because he in fact was one, but because he was at-
tempting to secure payment of the promissory note. 
No lien or encumbrance instruments have ever been 
filed by or on behalf of Anderson and certainly no lien 
or encumbrances shown on the title. Inasmuch as the 
statutes of this state specify the method by which a lien 
against an automobile is perfected, and inasmuch as 
Anderson's attempt to perfect his lien was not in accord-
ance with these statutes, his attempt thereat was defec-
tive and he has no valid lien on said automobile. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff respectfully asserts that the position taken 
by it in Points I and II of this brief arc well taken. 
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In this regard plaintiff again contends that Ander-
son had no ownership interest in the automobile. His 
name was put on the title only to secure payment of the 
promissory note. Anderson bought the car for Collard 
and took Collard's note in exchange. Plaintiff levied 
upon the automobile on May 2, 1968, and Anderson tes-
tified, although there is no documentary evidence thereof, 
that on May 3, 1968, Mr. Collard transferred the auto-
mobile to Mr. Anderson. It is of interest to note that 
this transfer occurred the day after plaintiff levied on 
the vehicle. This action on the part of Collard and An-
derson raises the question that if both Anderson and 
Colla.rd actually believed Anderson to be the owner of 
the automobile why was it necessary for Collard to trans-
fer title to Anderson on May 3. If they both considered 
Collard to be the owner and the action on May 3 was 
designed to protect Anderson, then their action was too 
late to affect plaintiff's levy of execution. 
Based upon the foregoing argument and authorities, 
plaintiff takes the position that this court should reve·rse 
the order of the District Court directing plaintiff to re-
lease possession of the 1968 Cadillac automobile and de-
liver it to intervenor and order the reinstatement of the 
order of execution on said vehicle originally entered by 
the lower court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KIPP AND CHARLIER 
SPENCER L. HAYCOCK 
D. GARY CHRISTIAN 
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Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Appellant 
